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Abstract: Wide variety of restructuring activities in the former state-owned enterprises has been
documented in the literature. The present paper provides an analysis of channels of restructuring in a
panel of 483 Czech companies privatized by the voucher method. The fixed-effects model with
observations between 1993 and 1997 is used for this purpose. The results indicate that asset sale, labor
shedding, employee incentives, sales growth, and inventory management serve as channels through
which performance of the privatized companies measured by sale efficiency is improved. On the other
hand, investment is not found to be a significant determinant of enterprise performance. Furthermore,
the analysis suggests that the companies still face a soft budget constraint.
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1 Introduction
The ultimate objective of economic reforms is to put in place a functional market
system, to increase production efficiency and to improve living standards. One of the
principal areas of the reforms has been enterprise restructuring. That is, the process
that transforms the unviable, loss making planned economy enterprises into vigorous,
competitive entities. This complex process encompasses several issues such as the
forms and determinants of restructuring, sequencing with respect to privatization, the
role of ownership structure and implementation of effective corporate governance.
Experience with privatization projects in the Western Europe showed quite
convincingly that private enterprises perform better than state owned enterprises
(Hutchinson, 1991, Megginson et al, 1994, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). This evidence
motivated the advocates of a big bang approach (Lipton and Sachs, 1990, Blanchard
et al., 1991), who argued that only private ownership would put in place proper
incentives for enterprises to restructure. Therefore, they stressed the importance of
speedy privatization. On the other hand, the supporters of a gradual reform (Roland,
1994, among others) insisted that privatization per se is not the remedy for the
problems of the state-owned enterprises (henceforth SOEs). Accordingly, while
privatization is important, a healthy financial system imposing hard budget constraints
on the enterprises is a necessary prerequisite of enterprise restructuring.
Several studies focused on the strategies that SOEs followed in order to survive and
become competitive (see, for example, Grosfeld and Roland, 1995, Carlin and
Landesmann, 1997). Early case studies documented that even SOEs before
privatization were engaged in some activities to cope with the existing situation
(Carlin et al., 1995, Barberis, 1996, Aghion et al., 1994). The evidence indicates that
managers of these enterprises undertook measures to reduce costs. However,
arguments were raised that this was just an adjustment
1 instead of forward-looking
‘real’ restructuring (Blanchard, 1997). The latter type of restructuring, also called
strategic or deep restructuring, entailing activities based on a “thoughtful business
strategy leading to a profound redeployment of assets” (Grosfeld and Roland, 1995)
was found only in companies privatized by a foreign investor (Carlin and Aghion,
1996).
Frydman et al. (1999) analyzing the effect of privatization in three Central European
economies (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) argue that what matters is not
only privatization as such, but also the type of owner to whom it gives control. In
particular, when the effect of privatization in general is measured, one comes to a
misleading conclusion that privatization in itself is good for the enterprises. However,
distinguishing particular types of owners reveals that only foreign investors and
private domestic financial firms perform better than state. On the other hand, insiders
do not perform better than the state.
The literature dealing with the activities of firms after privatization focuses almost
exclusively on the relationship between restructuring or improved performance on the
one hand and ownership structure on the other hand (Claessens, 1997, Earle, 1998,
                                               
1 These activities are also referred to as defensive of reactive restructuring (Grosfeld and Roland, 1995
and Carlin and Aghion, 1996, respectively).3
among others). The general conclusion of the studies is again that privatization per se
is not enough in order to secure restructuring. Foreign ownership proved to
consistently outperform the other privatizing investors.
The common approach of these papers was that they regressed some measure of
performance on ownership or ownership-concentration dummies. To my knowledge,
none of the studies, however, tried to analyze the restructuring activities in firms after
privatization and in particular to show which of the activities induced improved
performance of the firms.
2 Nevertheless, the need to explore the sources of
restructuring was stressed, for example, by Earle and Estrin (1998).
This paper analyzes the channels of restructuring in a panel of 483 former SOEs
privatized in the Czech voucher privatization. It identifies the activities, which have
had a positive effect on performance of the former SOEs since 1993, the year of the
transfer of ownership rights after the first wave of the voucher privatization, until
1997.
The main findings of the present analysis are fourfold. First, asset sale, labor
shedding, employee incentives, sales growth, and inventory management are
associated with improvements in enterprise performance measured by sale efficiency
(real sales per employee). Second, investment activities of the SOEs have an
ambiguous effect on performance. Third, there is some indication of soft budget
constraint imposed on the companies. Finally, the two measures of enterprise
performance used in the present paper – sale efficiency and profitability – appear to
be negatively correlated. This is a surprising finding because these two measures are
often used interchangeably in the transition literature as proxies for enterprise
performance and restructuring.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, the aggregate
developments with respect to restructuring in the Czech Republic are reviewed. The
hypotheses about potential restructuring channels are discussed in the third section.
The data set, methodology used and main results are described in section 4. Section 5
summarizes the main results and outlines suggestions for further research.
2 Aggregate Developments in the Czech Republic
The transfer of ownership from state to private hands together with increased
competition and hardening of the budget constraint have long been regarded as the
major determinants of enterprise performance and efficiency. The disciplining role of
these three mechanisms was acknowledged not only for market economies, but even
more so for transition economies (Earle and Estrin, 1998). Therefore, the reforms
were designed as to accomplish the liberalization of prices and trade, the reduction of
state subsidies and bailouts and also privatization of SOEs.
In the Czech Republic, price and trade liberalization was introduced early in the
transition process. According to the EBRD Transition Report 1998, the Czech
                                               
2 Zemplinerova, Lastovicka, and Marcincin (1995) studied restructuring activities of firms in their
sample. However, majority of the firms studied were SOEs preparing for the voucher privatization.4
Republic, along with Hungary, have progressed furthest in term of overall
liberalization, reaching an average liberalization index of 3.63.
3
Privatization policy also reflected the government’s commitment to the reforms. The
fast privatization program resulted in a swift transfer of property rights.
4 In the period
from 1990 till 1993, a centralized economy with 96.7% of output produced by SOEs
was transformed into an economy with 67% of output produced by ‘private’ firms.
5
However, many doubts have been expressed about the ability of new owners to
improve performance of the former SOEs. The voucher privatization
6 delivered a
rather peculiar ownership pattern. The fears that it would result in dispersed
ownership did not materialize, instead, investment privatization funds (IPFs hereafter)
arose as the most important players. The IPFs captured more than 50% of shares in
334 companies out of 842 companies where more than 50% was privatization by
means of vouchers (Lastovicka et al., 1994). Claessens et al. (1997) reports that in
their sample of 706 firms privatized via the voucher privatization, the IPFs hold an
average stake of around 23% compared to 2.4% and 0.1% average stakes held by state
and domestic strategic owners, respectively. The average stake of foreign direct
investors was less than 0.05%.
7
As Coffee (1996) points out, highly dispersed ownership together with insufficiently
transparent and illiquid financial market could not operate as a direct mechanism of
corporate governance. Moreover, many of the most important IPFs acquired a stake in
the main Czech banks, which in turn controlled the IPFs. This phenomenon resulted
in a strange and non-transparent system of cross-ownership between the major banks
and the IPFs. Furthermore, the IPFs were regarded as neither the optimal nor final
owners because of their lack of access to finance for restructuring and inadequate
expertise (Carlin and Aghion, 1996), and therefore additional reshuffling of
ownership was said to be desirable.
The implementation of the hard budget constraint is ambiguous. On the one hand,
state subsidies were abolished early in the transition process. However, the
government’s policy toward bankruptcies and bank-bailouts was rather ‘soft.’ First,
the incidence of bankruptcies in the Czech Republic has been very low compared to
Hungary or Poland. The government evidently protected insolvent firms against
bankruptcy. Second, the problems of large state banks with high ratio of classified
                                               
3 The EBRD assesses progress in eight areas: large-scale and small-scale privatization,
governance/enterprise restructuring, price liberalization, trade and foreign exchange liberalization,
competition policy, banking reform and securities markets. The indicators take values from 1 (little
progress) to 4+ (comparable to developed industrial economies). The figure reported above was
computed as simple mean of the EBRD progress-in-transition indicators, ranging from 1 to 4+, with 4+
replaced by 5 for the computation of the means.
4 For a detailed description of the Czech privatization program see Kotrba (1994).
5 However, the transfer of ownership rights after the first wave of the voucher privatization was
executed only by mid 1993. Furthermore, the ownership structures resulting from the voucher
privatization were rather ambiguous, because of cross-ownership by state-controlled banks and bank-
controlled privatization funds. See Turnovec (1999).
6 Out of 949 firms privatized in the fist wave of privatization, in 842 firms a stake of 50% and more of
shares was offered through vouchers.
7 These are numbers concerning the first wave. The results of the second wave were slightly more
favorable towards the latter three types of owners. However, the discrepancy in average sizes of stakes
remained the same.5
loans were solved by state bailouts rather then by bank privatization. Hence, the credit
policies of major banks did not harden the budget constraint of the SOEs, rather the
opposite was the case.
In contrast to Poland and Hungary, no particular restructuring program was
implemented. It was generally expected that changes in ownership together with
increasingly competitive environment would evoke changes towards the efficiency
frontier. Consequently, two natural questions arise. First, how has the Czech economy
performed relative to the other leading transition economies in Europe? Second, has
privatization alone been sufficient in achieving effective ownership structures leading
to deep restructuring in the Czech Republic? In the present study, the latter question is
addressed. Nevertheless, although the former question is not the subject of this paper,
it is informative to look at the development of some aggregate economic indicators in
the Czech Republic, and compare it to the development in Hungary and Poland.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of real GDP in the three countries. In order to get the
correct perspective, time was measured as the number of years since the beginning of
reforms. For Poland and Hungary, 1990 is considered to be the first year of transition,
whereas 1991 is the starting point for the Czech Republic (cf. Blanchard, 1997).
During the first years of transition, the Czech economy was performing relatively
well. GDP did not drop as low as in the other two countries, and started to recover in
the third year, in 1993. However, GDP growth has deteriorated in the more recent
years, in particular since 1996. Moreover, it became negative in 1998. In contrast, the
Polish economy has experienced more dynamic growth.
Figure 2, giving the evolution of aggregate labor productivity,
8 might indicate the
reason for low dynamics of Czech GDP growth. Czech aggregate labor productivity
performance was poor when compared to Poland and Hungary. This suggests that
firms across the Czech Republic have not been as flexible in terms of labor shedding
as firms in the two other countries. The poor labor productivity growth in the Czech
Republic perhaps reflects soft governmental policy towards bankruptcies and bank
bailouts as well as low bank discipline.
Also, the development of fixed capital formation has not been as dramatic in the
Czech Republic as in Hungary or Poland. This might suggest low long-term
orientation, and hence low level of restructuring in the Czech Republic.
3 Enterprise Restructuring: Hypotheses and Previous
Evidence
The aggregate data discussed in the previous section suggest that the Czech economy
encountered some problems, which led to a slow down of its aggregate output and
labor productivity growth since mid 1994. Many observers believe that one of the
main reasons behind the slow down of transformation is slow microeconomic
restructuring (Dlouhy, 1999). In order to provide more profound conclusion about the
extent of restructuring at the micro level, it is necessary to examine firm level data.
Earle and Estrin (1998, p. 14) point out that, “[t]he impact of competition, ownership,
and budget constraints on labor productivity may […] work through several channels,
                                               
8 Aggregate labor productivity was computed as GDP in constant prices divided by the number of
employed people in the economy.6
including actions to enhance efficiency by reducing input waste, to increase sales
[…], and to augment the quantity and quality of the capital stock and improve the
technology through new investment.” To identify these channels in  the privatized
Czech SOEs is the main aim of the present paper. In particular, I investigate what are
the restructuring activities that significantly improve enterprise performance.
9 The
underlying framework used here is captured by the following equation:
Performance = f(restructuring activities, control variables).
Studies on enterprise restructuring in transition (e.g. Carlin et al., 1995, Grosfeld and
Roland, 1995, and Pohl et al., 1997) document that companies have been engaged in a
wide variety of restructuring activities before as well as after privatization. In order to
simplify the analysis and to generalize the findings, Carlin et al. (1995) handles
restructuring as actions taken along the following four dimensions: (i) internal
organization (e.g. unbundling, shedding social assets); (ii) employment (e.g. labor
shedding, wage differentiation); (iii) output (e.g. marketing, product mix); and (iv)
investment (e.g. in wholesale network, capital equipment). The strategy of
categorizing restructuring activities into several groups proves useful also in Kang
and Shivdasanyi (1997), a study on restructuring in underperforming Japanese
corporations. The latter study uses seven categories of restructuring activities,
10
however, most of them correspond to the categories used in the former study.
In the present analysis, a categorization gained by a combination of the two above-
mentioned categorizations is used. The set of restructuring groups used here consists
of five categories. They include all four dimensions used in Carlin et al. (1995), which
correspond to the fist four groups of Kang and Shivdasanyi (1997), plus a category
reflecting changes in control (the firth category in the latter study).
11 The five
categories used here are labeled according to Kang and Shivdasanyi (1997). Each of
the following subsections is devoted to one of the dimensions and contains a
discussion of the expected effect of the corresponding dimension on company
performance.
3.1 Asset contraction policies
This dimension of restructuring activities refers to the sale of assets, spin-offs of units,
and plant closures. For a large socialist type of state owned enterprise, all of these
activities may be an important source of performance improvement since it is
desirable for such a company to downsize, in order to become efficient and focused
on one or several most profitable products (Grosfeld and Roland, 1995). All of these
activities are also used in market economies by companies in need for restructuring.
In particular, Kang and Shivdasanyi (1997) report that 23% of the Japanese and 49%
                                               
9 Further in the paper, the terms of ‘channels of restructuring’ and ‘restructuring activities’ are used
interchangeably.
10 The categories used are the following: (i) asset contraction policies; (ii) changes in employment
policies; (iii) expansion policies; (iv) internal reorganizations; (v) changes in control; (vi) external
takeover activity; and (vii) miscellaneous actions.
11 The remaining two categories of the latter study are not covered here. The ‘miscellaneous actions’
category is too heterogeneous, and I believe the activities covered there play only a minor role in the
total effect of restructuring. On the other hand, the ‘external control activity’ category, including for
example block purchases, is perhaps quite important also in the Czech context. Unfortunately, our data
set does not cover this kind of information.7
of the American companies in their sample
12 used an activity along this restructuring
dimension. The main reason why a Japanese or U.S. company may decide to adopt an
asset contracting policy is that some of the firm’s operations could have become
economically unviable. However, many of the former planned economy SOEs’ assets
are by definition unviable or unprofitable. Social assets (e.g. day care centers,
recreational facilities) may serve as an example. Hence the need to use this kind of
restructuring and its positive effect on performance is even more profound in the case
of former state owned enterprise facing a new, changed environment.
The privatization policy adopted in the Czech Republic had a special effect
concerning restrictions on assets sales, which deserves to be mentioned here. In
particular, because privatization was regarded to be of higher priority and importance
than restructuring, and the threat of unfair dealings of managers was present, the
Czech government decided to forbid asset sales in the companies until after the
privatization (Grosfeld and Roland, 1995). On the other hand, the program explicitly
encouraged split-ups, which was reflected in remarkable increase in the number of
enterprises just before approval of privatization projects.
13 This has an obvious
consequence for the analysis along this dimension. Since so many split-ups and hardly
any asset sales occurred prior to the privatization, one can, without a substantial loss
of information, focus only on asset sales when analyzing the restructuring activities in
the companies after their privatization.
3.2 Changes in Employment Policies
Changes in employment policies include employee layoffs, wage differentiation or
changes in incentive (compensation) schemes, and other actions that significantly
affect the composition or compensation of the firm’s employees.
Since labor hoarding was endemic in companies in planned economies, at the
beginning of transformation, the need for labor shedding in SOEs was obvious at the
beginning of reforms (Pohl et al., 1997, Grosfeld and Roland, 1995). It was even
strengthened by severe demand and price shocks resulting in significant fall in sales.
It is documented that SOEs across the region (even before privatization) indeed
responded to the fall of their sales by lowering output, and consequently by
considerable decrease of their labor levels (Carlin et al., 1995). Pursuing this line of
argumentation, a negative relationship between employment change and performance
can be expected in the companies where labor hoarding is still prevalent.
This relationship can be expected also in the present analysis only under the condition
that the privatized Czech companies experience excess employment even in the
period since 1993, hence, at least two years after the first transition changes. I argue
that labor hoarding is indeed still a problem in most of the privatized Czech SOEs.
Primarily, one might question the extent of labor shedding in the Czech companies
                                               
12 Their sample consists of 92 Japanese manufacturing firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and
114 U.S. manufacturing firms listed on the New York American Stock Exchanges during 1986 to 1990.
Sample firms had a ratio of pretax operating income to assets that exceeds the industry median in a
given year and experience a decline of at least 50% in operating income in the subsequent year.
13 The actual numbers of enterprises prior to and after the approval of privatization projects is 1179 and
3293, respectively (source: Ministry of Privatization, February 1994, quoted by Grosfeld and Roland,
1995).8
before the privatization. Low unemployment levels
14 indicate that the companies laid
only as little employees as was necessitated by the fall of sales and output, but did not
go any further in order to improve labor productivity. Consequently, after the sales of
companies started to rise again, employment levels increased again proportionately.
Of course, it might be argued that the low (on Central European standards)
unemployment was a result of faster job creation in the private sector. However, the
recent problems in the Czech Republic and revelation of existence of soft budget
constraints faced by the privatized companies rather suggest the first explanation
(Dlouhy, 1999). Hence, I conclude that a negative effect of employment change on
enterprise performance can be expected.
The only evidence so far on the policies concerning changes in employee incentive
schemes are case studies (Carlin et al., 1995) documenting many examples where
managers try to introduce some kind of wage differentiation. Furthermore, the case
study evidence also documents pressure for higher wages from the side of private
sector forcing the SOEs not willing to lose skilled labor to increase wages. From these
findings a positive relationship between labor costs and performance can be
conjectured. The argumentation is as follows. First, it is obvious that the main goal
behind an introduction of widened wage differentials is performance improvement. At
the same time I assume that wage differentiation is associated with total labor cost
increase, since good workers having the opportunity to switch to private sector require
quite substantial wage increase. Second, the pressure from the private sector causes
general wage increase in companies willing to keep skill workforce. A further
argument in favor of this conjecture is the low unemployment level in the Czech
Republic showing that it was generally not difficult to switch jobs. Hence, a positive
relationship between wages and enterprise performance is hypothesized in the present
analysis.
3.3 Expansion Policies
Actions along the expansion policy category enhance the scope or scale of operations.
Such actions include construction of new plants, increased output or capital
expenditures.
The need for new investment (modernization of equipment or construction of new
lines of production) in former SOEs in transition countries was expressed in many
studies (e.g., Blanchard, 1997, Grosfeld and Roland, 1995, and Carlin and Aghion,
1996). This fact is also supported by the very high obsoleteness of the companies’
fixed assets, which is in turn illustrated by very high values of the ratio of
accumulated depreciation to total fixed assets. The average value of this ratio for the
Czech non-financial enterprises with 25 and more employees was 44,2% in 1993
15.
Since equipment of new firms is by definition relatively less obsolete and there has
been considerable growth in the number of new firms in the Czech Republic since
1991, the equipment obsoleteness of SOEs seems to be remarkable. At the same time,
there is evidence (Carlin et al., 1996, and Zemplinerova et al., 1995) that before 1993,
the Czech SOEs undertook almost no major investment projects. Consequently, the
need for investment in the privatized Czech SOEs is straightforward. Furthermore, it
                                               
14 Unemployment in the Czech Republic has not exceeded 5% till 1997. On the contrary, it has been
constantly higher than 10% in the other Visegrad countries.
15 The number was computed based on sectional statistics published by the National statistical office.9
is quite intuitive to assume that the higher the level of investment, the better the
performance of the company.
However, the literature so far does not support this positive relationship for the Czech
economy. Carlin and Landesmann (1997) point out that the high economy wide ratio
of investment to value added failed to translate into rapid productivity growth in the
Czech Republic. The relatively high levels of investments in the Czech economy
puzzled also Blanchard (1997). Carlin and Landesmann (1997) argue that a very large
initial devaluation of the national currency provided protection for all companies and
thus enabled spreading of investment across all firms instead of its concentration in
the most promising enterprises. On the other hand, Dlouhy (1999) argues that, in the
Czech Republic, the amount of the ‘productive investment’ was relatively low, since
total domestic investment was dominated by infrastructure and ecological investment
(very often of mandatory nature). This fact then explains that the direct effect of
investment on productivity could have been very weak (or not present). Nevertheless,
it is expected in the present analysis that modernization of equipment has positive
effect on enterprise performance.
Another activity fitting under the heading of expansion policies is output increase.
This concerns activities aiming at finding markets for the firm’s products and
adapting new product ranges. The importance of this kind of activities is underlined
by the loss of CMEA
16 markets and collapse of the traditional wholesale networks
(Carlin et al., 1995). The ability to adjust product ranges and find new customers
should be reflected in increased sales. Furthermore, if sales are measured in constant
prices, increase in value of sales encompasses also enhanced quality of products
reflected in higher prices. Hence, positive relationship between sales growth and
performance is expected.
3.4 Changes in Control
(to be included to the regressions later)
The issue of changes in the top management and their association with improved
performance is quite elaborated in the literature for developed economies (for an
overview see Jensen and Zimmermann, 1985). In general, the findings support a
positive relationship between changes in the top management and corporate
performance or market valuation. However, in transition economies, the situation on
the market for managers, development of remuneration motivation of managers, and
also general competitiveness among managers are not completely comparable to those
of the developed economies. In developed countries, properly working market for
managers and at the same time properly designed remuneration schemes motivate the
incumbent managers to perform well. However, these incentive mechanisms are not
developed well in transition countries. In particular, the market for managers is
underdeveloped and quality of managerial skills of the available managers is quite
low (Carlin et al., 1995, Claessens and Djankov, 1999). A survey of managerial
positions conducted by Aspect kilcullen s. r. o.
17 may serve as an illustration of the
situation in the Czech Republic. According to this study, almost all incumbent
managers (in 1995) were native Czechs. Only 5% of them had foreign university
                                               
16 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
17 Adamek, Milan, 1995, ‘Kdo jsoou?,’ (Who they are?) Prùvodce èeským trhem s cennými papíry
(Czech capital market guide), Aspect kilcullen, p. 21.10
education, and less than 10% had some type of managerial education. Furthermore,
majority of the managers (around 90%) were placed in the position in the pre-
privatization period, and survived also the change of ownership. Furthermore, the
literature provides a limited support for the hypothesis that bringing in new human
capital is important in improving enterprise performance rather than improving
incentives for the incumbent (Barberis et al., 1996).
18 This evidence about the
situation in the transition countries supports, however, even stronger positive
relationship between turnover of top managers and performance of their companies.
3.5 Changes in Internal Organization
Internal reorganizations involve a restructuring without downsizing or enhancement
of scale of the firms operations (Kang and Shivdasanyi, 1997). Examples of such
activities include cost-cutting efforts, incorporating technological advances, changing
production methods, or lowering of inventory levels. Since many activities along this
category are difficult to measure, I focus only on inventory management. As
mentioned already in the sections above, resource wastage was endemic for the
planned economy enterprises (Carlin et al., 1995). Thus, a better inventory




The data used in the analysis were purchased from Aspect kilcullen s r.o., a consulting
firm specializing in collecting accounting and trading data of firms traded at the
Czech capital market. The database contains information on 1748 Czech non-financial
firms. However, because of missing observations, only 503 firms had full data
availability since 1993 till 1997. Further five firms were excluded because they were
not privatized through the voucher method and, hence, have not been traded at the
stock market. Finally, 15 firms were eliminated as outliers.
19 Hence, I ended up with a
panel of 483 Czech firms privatized through the voucher method over the period from
1993 till 1997.
Average values of basic indicators characterizing the firms over the whole time span
and separately for each of the years are presented in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
Table 3 lists the definitions of the variables used in the previous tables. The basic
indicators reveal wide variation among the firms. The book value of assets of an
average firm over the studied period was slightly more than 2 billion Czech crowns
(CZK), which is approximately 70 million USD.
20 The average sales were 1,3 billion
CZK and the average employment was approximately 1,200 people. Hence, one
employee was on average able to produce 1.6 million CZK worth of sales (sale
                                               
18 Barberis et al. confirm this hypothesis on a sample of privatized Russian shops. Since the entities
studied are not representative for the whole population of enterprises, generalization of the findings
may not be possible.
19 The criterion for identifying outliers was increase in employment or sales per employee exceeding
500% in any of the years.
20 Average exchange rate over the period was around 28,8 CZK per one USD.11
efficiency in constant prices of 1993) and was on average paid 130 thousand CZK per
year (labor costs per employee). On average, the firms were left with 28% of sales
after paying for materials and energy. After further paying to their employees, the
firms were able retain 17% of the total value of sales.
21 This indicates a quite low
profitability level of the firms in the sample.
In order to extract more detailed information on profitability of the SOEs, I
considered the stages of profitability (cf. Pohl et. al, 1997).
22 First, after subtracting all
operating expenses, on average only 12% of the total revenue remained in the firm.
Second, after paying all net financial obligations, the average firm retained 7,2% of
the total value of sales. Furthermore, its net operating income before and after taxes
was negative. Additional information is obtained by inspecting the number of firms
with positive result at each stage of profitability. Over the period 1993–1997, roughly
91% of the firms were able to pay all operating expenses out of their revenues, 85%
of firms were also able to pay their net debt service. Around 70% of the firms had
positive base for computing their income tax from operating activities, and 68% of
them still remained in black after paying the taxes. Quite alarming is the development
of these numbers over the years. Whereas in 1993, 76% of firms were able to retain
some profit after paying taxes, in 1997, there were only 58% of such firms. The
decrease was continuous over years.
The development of basic indicators is captured by Figure 3. Though in decreasing
rate, labor productivity grew steadily and faster than sales, primarily because of
falling employment. However, even though employment dropped, labor related costs
were growing as fast as labor productivity. Consequently, no resources were left over
to improve the profitability position of the average firm. Furthermore, the
development of costs of sales as a fraction of the total sales also indicates that even
though the firms were able to increase sales on average, their cost efficiency
deteriorated. They had to devote more and more recourses to produce one monetary
unit worth of sales. This fact might suggest that the firms were not concerned with
profitability, instead they focused on increasing their sales. Another possible
explanation might be that prices of their inputs grew faster than prices of their final
products.
23
When compared to the aggregate figures for the whole Czech Republic, the
improvement of the SOEs was on average considerably better. Their sales increased
faster, and in contrast to growing aggregate employment the employment of SOEs
was declining. Thus, their sale efficiency grew faster than sales while sale efficiency
grew slower than output at the country level.
The analysis above suggests that despite some improvement, the privatized SOEs had
considerable problems with profitability during the period 1993–1997. This might
indicate poor restructuring. In order to see whether this pattern was general across all
the firms, I divided the sample into quartiles according to their initial level of sale and
cost efficiency, and computed means of several variables across firms and time within
the individual quartiles. To be sure that the industry bias was excluded, the measures
                                               
21 Not reported in Table 1.
22 Not reported.
23 Even though I corrected for inflation, I used just one price deflator for both output as well as inputs.12
were adjusted by respective industry means. In particular, the industry adjusted sale
efficiency measure was computed as follows:
sereli = (sei – seindi)/seindi
Where sei represents sale efficiency of a firm i in 1993, and seindi indicates average
sale efficiency of the respective industry (a similar measure was used by Claessens
and Djankov, 1999). Similarly, I constructed an industry adjusted measure of cost
efficiency. In addition, the F-test was used to see when there was enough evidence to
reject the hypothesis of equality of the quartile means. The results are given in Tables
4 and 5.
Table 4 shows the characteristics of the quartiles according to the industry adjusted
sale efficiency in 1993. Values for the average sale efficiency over the whole time
period  are ordered in the same direction as the quartiles. This suggests that the
influence of industry affiliation is not significant. Since employment is not different
across the four groups, it is obvious that higher sales were the source of higher labor
productivity across the quartiles. The striking fact is that the average costs efficiency
goes significantly in the opposite direction to sale efficiency; the quartile with the
highest labor productivity has the lowest cost efficiency. However, all the measures of
profitability are not significantly different across the groups.
24 This suggests that even
though firms had higher sales, and hence higher sale efficiency, they were not able to
be more profitable because of high operating costs.
On the other hand, the analysis of growth variables in the same table reveals that the
firms in the lowest quartile increased their sales and sale efficiency the most, hence
some convergence was present. Cost efficiency has on average deteriorated across all
the groups.
In Table 5, firms are divided into quartiles according to their industry-adjusted costs
of sales ratio in 1993. Similarly to the previous table, no industry bias is present
because the distribution of the average cost efficiency corresponds to the quartiles.
The strange fact that the most cost inefficient firms are the most sale efficient ones is
again present here. Thus, the most productive firms are not the most profitable ones
and vice versa. What is the source of this confusion? Obviously, the firms with the
highest sale efficiency were able to maintain the highest sales while employment
remained relatively low. On the contrary, their costs were very high, which explains
their low profitability.
4.2 Methodology
The inefficiency of firms under the centrally planned economic system was
documented in many studies (for a classic summary see Kornai, 1992). The way
socialist firms operated was totally different from the practices usual in competitive
capitalist firms (Earle and Estrin, 1998). Consequently, it is obvious that the former
SOEs needed substantial adjustment after the introduction of a competitive market
environment. Besides, the general situation at the beginning of the transition period
was quite unfavorable for the SOEs. They had to deal with severe demand and price
shocks, the collapse of CMEA, increased competition from international companies
entering the markets and severe recession in the region. Hence, improvements in
                                               
24 Not reported.13
productivity as well as profitability became crucial and may serve as measures of
improvement in companies.
A wide variety of measures of performance improvement in companies in transition
countries have been used in the relevant literature. The prevalently used measure is
the labor productivity, defined as real sales per employee (Earle and Estrin, 1998,
Pohl et al., 1997, Frydman et al., 1998, and Linz and Krueger, 1998, among others).
Usually, productivity change is used. Only studies on Russia and former Soviet
republics prefer to use labor productivity level instead of change, arguing that because
of hyperinflation and massive changes in relative prices, productivity growth is hard
to measure (Earle and Estrin, 1998).
Frydman et al. (1998) highlights the importance of the revenue side of profit
statements as the one with a much more direct relation to the entrepreneurial ability of
managers to maneuver in a new environment. Moreover, Frydman et al. (1998) argues
further that cost relations are more predictable for company insiders, and are often
only a matter of will and standard procedures, especially if large inefficiencies are
obvious. Hence, distinguishing between revenues and costs of sales, the two sides of
profitability can offer more information. Therefore, sale efficiency (defined as total
sales in constant prices per employee)
25 and profitability (profit margin
26 over total
sales) are used in the present analysis to measure company performance. In addition,
cost efficiency (total sales over costs of sales) is used next to profitability in order to
detect the different development of sales and cost of sales across the companies,
which was indicated in the data section.
It could be argued that total factor productivity change, often used in studies about
developed countries, is a better measure, since it measures the success of a firm in
increasing the productivity of all factors of production: labor, material inputs, and
capital (Pohl et al., 1997). However, the quality of this measure highly depends on the
proper accounting of fixed assets and inventories, and thus might be questioned in
transition countries (Djankov, 1999).
Table 6 provides a short summary of the various channels of restructuring discussed
in the hypothesis section. At the same time, variables serving as proxies for the
individual restructuring channels, their expected effects on the dependent variables,
and control variables are included as well.
In the present study, I estimate the impact of explanatory variables on performance of
companies by fixed effects panel regressions. This method of estimation provides
better estimators than simple OLS when the explanatory variables are correlated with
the error term. It is quite straightforward to argue that there is probably significant
correlation between unobservable individual characteristics of the firms (which are
captured by the error term of the OLS regression), and some of the explanatory
variables. For example, a good manager (individual effect) could be more able to
increase sales (explanatory variable). Therefore, if OLS were used, coefficient
estimates would be biased. In particular, in the case of the correlation between sales
and managerial abilities, the effect of sales on firm performance would be
overestimated. Using a fixed-effects model can solve the problem of correlation. In
                                               
25 The term labor productivity is usually used in the transition literature. Sale efficiency was used for
example in Megginson et al.
26 Profit margin is defined as total sales minus cost of sales.14
the fixed effects model, the differences across firms are captured by the differences in
constant term (see Greene, 1993, pp. 444-485 as a general reference on panel data
regressions). Hence, the part of the error term causing correlation with the explanatory
variables is taken out and included in the regression as a set of individual dummy
variables.
4.3 Results
A general investigation of basic characteristics in the data section revealed a negative
relationship between sale efficiency and profitability across the enterprises. Usually,
these two variables are used as proxies for the same phenomenon, namely corporate
performance or enterprise restructuring. This implies that positive correlation between
sale efficiency and profitability is uniformly assumed. If, however, the correlation is
negative, it is important to investigate the problem closer. This section presents the
results of panel regressions with sale efficiency, profitability as well as cost efficiency
as dependent variables. The results are expected to indicate what are the factors
behind high sale or cost efficiency improvements – the channels of restructuring. At
the same time they might shed some light on the relationship between these two
measures of performance.
Table 7 summarizes the regression estimates. OLS as well as fixed-effects estimates
are reported. The corresponding coefficients for the two methods are in many cases
significantly different. Also, the Hausman test for dependence between individual
effects and explanatory variables is highly significant for all three specifications. This
implies that using OLS without explicitly including fixed individual effects to explain
firm performance would lead to inconsistent estimates. Using the fixed-effect model
solves this problem.
4.3.1 Sale Efficiency
The second column of Table 7 reveals the sources behind increase of sale efficiency.
Most of the results go in line with what was expected. Asset sale is positively
associated with sale efficiency, higher wages lead to higher sale efficiency, and
increase in sales means in general also improvement of sale efficiency. Also as
expected is the effect of inventory level, the higher are inventories, the lower is
efficiency. Employment affects sale efficiency negatively indicating that labor
shedding has positive influence on this performance measure.
27
However, capital expenditures do not affect sale efficiency significantly, what is not
in line with the expectation. This result suggests that investment in the companies
does not lead to improved sale efficiency. This in fact confirms the conjecture of
Carlin and Landesmann (1997) that investment in the Czech companies was not
distributed among companies in order to improve performance but rather scattered
across all the firms without any effect on performance. However, one has to be careful
not to draw very strong conclusions since just the effect of investment in a given year
is measured in the regression. Usually, given investment influences the firm’s
productivity over a longer time period.
                                               
27 Employment is not included to the first two regressions in Table 7 because of identification problems
(sale efficiency = sale / employment). An equation with employment as a regressor was also estimated,
though it is not reported in Table 7.15
The control variable for bank loans reveals an interesting result. The corresponding
coefficient is negative documenting that the more bank loans a firm has, the less
efficient it gets. This finding is a confirmation of a widely spread opinion that the
privatized Czech companies do not face hard budget constraint. This result documents
that banks do not partition their resources according to efficiency requirements, they
rather provide funds to inefficient firms long standing in their portfolio. It is also
worth to mention that on average, bigger firms are less efficient.
4.3.2 Profitability and Cost Efficiency
Contrary to the first regression, the effects of the restructuring activities on
profitability and cost efficiency are not performing according to the expectation. The
only result where the expectation was confirmed is the negative effect of inventory
level meaning that higher inventory levels are associated with poorer profitability and
cost efficiency.
Opposite to the expectation is the negative effect of asset sales suggesting that the
more a firm gets rid of unproductive assets, the less profitable it remains. This might
point to the fact that firms do not reorganize their assets till they are in a quite
unfavorable financial situation. Then, asset sales do not help to improve the situation
any more. Also, the effect of labor costs is, contrary to the expectation, negative.
While the relationship between sales produced by one employee (sale efficiency) and
wage per employee is positive (the first regression), the relationship between profit
margin per one unit of sales and wage per employee is negative. Hence, higher labor
expenses help to improve sales, but have deteriorating effect on the profit margin.
This leads to a conclusion that firms do not watch costs, they rather focus on
increasing sales. The marginally significant, negative coefficient of total sales in the
cost-efficiency regression leads to a similar conjecture. This coefficient indicates that
increasing sales induce decreasing profit margin per one unit of cost (cost efficiency)
implying that costs grow faster than sales.
Labor shedding was expected to have positive effect on performance. Hence, negative
coefficient of the employment variable was expected. However, the coefficient is
insignificant in the profitability/cost-efficiency equations. Hence, employment policy
does not have any effect on profitability. Taking into consideration that most of the
former SOEs still have excess labor force, this result witnesses insufficient labor
shedding in the companies.
From the sale-efficiency regression, it was induced that there is insignificant
relationship between capital expenditures and sale efficiency. The effect of capital
expenditures remains without any significant effect also in the profitability/cost
efficiency equations.
When the control variables are concerned, the soft budget constraint is confirmed also
in these regressions. Hence, more bank loans available to a company are not used to
improve firm performance. On the contrary, the scarce resources are wasted in such a
way that they are used to produce less and less profit. Quite surprising is also the
result that profitability does not depend on firm size or amount of fixed assets used by
one employee. This indicates that profitable as well as unprofitable firms are scattered
all over the country and do not have any size or technology (industry) affiliation.
4.3.3 Sale Versus Cost Efficiency
In the regressions in Table 7, the forces behind improved performance of privatized
SOEs are analyzed. The results discussed in the two sections above suggest that there16
are notable differences in the way the activities within the companies influence
company performance. In particular, the regression results suggest that the activities
within the companies are more concentrated on increasing sales, but do not lead to
higher profit margin. This conjecture is implied by the estimated coefficients in the
profitability/cost-efficiency regressions with signs opposite to expectation. This
evidence indicates that positive sale efficiency growth in the Czech SOEs is
associated with excessively high costs. In accordance with the argument of Frydman
et al. (1998), costs should be relatively predictable. Therefore, costs reduction should
be only a question of the will of managers. Is this not the case in the Czech Republic?
Or are the Czech managers not forced to reduce costs? If the latter is the case, than the
SOEs are still facing a soft budget constraint. In fact, the hypothesis of soft budget
constraint is also supported by the negative effect of available bank loans on the
performance measures.
5 Conclusions
In Summary, the results of the present study are fourfold. First, the study identifies the
restructuring activities with positive effect on performance measured by sale
efficiency, which are asset sale, labor shedding, efficiency-wage motivation, sale
increase, and inventory management.
Second, it is argued that these restructuring activities do not have the same effect on
profitability as they do on sale efficiency. In fact, the coefficients, with the exception
of inventory management, have opposite signs for the two specifications. This finding
points to an important conclusion that attention should be paid to these particular
variables when measuring firm performance. Because even though firms are engaged
in improving sale efficiency, they do not manage to increase profitability. Hence, one
should be aware that different conclusions could be induced from these two
performance measures. An analysis relying only on labor productivity as a measure of
performance and restructuring might lead to only a partial picture of the situation in
the analyzed firms. It is evenly important to look at cost reducing activities of the
studied firms.
Third, capital expenditures are not found to have significant effect on performance.
This finding might support the conjecture of Carlin and Landesmann (1997) that
investment in the Czech economy was dispersed among all firms and did not
concentrate only in the best firms with the highest returns.
Forth, the main policy implication that can be drawn from the present study concerns
the soft budget constraint faced by the SOEs. The results indicate that credit-
allocating policies of banks are not oriented towards good performing companies.
Also, investment activities are not undertaken in order to increase performance.
Finally, costs spent to produce revenues are not kept low perhaps because companies
are not forced to do so. Consequently, hardening the budget constraint should be one
of the primary goals of the Czech government. Privatization of the banking sector and
thorough enforcement of bankruptcies are examples of state policies in the right
direction.
Another implication of the analysis is that the ownership structures are probably not
efficient in delivering deep restructuring. However, based on the results of the present
study, it is not possible to make clear and definitive conclusion concerning the
corporate governance structures employed by the companies. Further research is17
desirable to shed some light on the relationship between ownership patterns and
channels of restructuring leading to better performance.
Further suggestion for future research is to include more countries (for example, all
Visegrad countries) in a similar analysis. Such an exercise might indicate how
different policies in terms of privatization, liberalization, and enforcement of the
budget constraint affect the extent and speed of restructuring.
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Table 1: Basic Statistics for the Whole Time Span
units # of obs. mean median st. dev. min max
sale efficiency
1 mill. CZK 2415 1.631 0.582 13.547 0.004 470.294
profitability 2415 0.284 0.292 0.220 -4.675 0.899
cost efficiency
asset sale 2415 0.063 0.014 0.464 -0.015 18.975
employment 2415 1,249 576 2,713 11 49,701
labor cost
1 th. CZK 2415 125.7 116.9 56.0 2.9 1080.2
capital expenditures 2415 0.043 0.007 0.180 0.000 4.925
sales
1 bill. CZK 2415 1.271 0.370 3.486 0.000 48.407
inventories 2415 0.256 0.179 0.562 0.000 19.884
total assets
1 bill. CZK 2415 2.041 0.532 8.206 0.015 171.810
bank 2415 0.170 0.153 0.141 -0.002 1.842
technology mix
1 mill. CZK 2415 0.733 0.390 1.021 0.001 13.411
sale eff. growth 1932 0.100 0.050 0.411 -0.991 4.101
profitability growth 1932 0.026 -0.023 3.002 -53.461 65.605
cost efficiency growth
employment change 1932 -0.029 0.000 0.134 -0.919 1.957
labor cost growth 1932 0.103 0.082 0.388 -0.937 8.681
sale growth 1932 0.057 0.018 0.388 -0.995 4.367
Notes: Definitions of the variables are listed in Table 3. Growth variables defined as follows:
growth=(vart-vart-1) / var t-1.
1 values are in CZK. Logarithmic transformation used in the regressions.20
Table 2: Basic Statistics: Overview by Years
units 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
sale efficiency
1 mill. CZK 2.479 1.877 1.443 1.143 1.211
(24.655) (14.238) (9.538) (2.518) (3.153)
profitability 0.293 0.306 0.282 0.267 0.271
(0.223) (0.167) (0.195) (0.207) (0.289)
asset sale 0.027 0.040 0.057 0.069 0.124
(0.114) (0.158) (0.163) (0.283) (0.964)
employment 1,409 1,290 1,233 1,179 1,135
(3,300) (2,732) (2,596) (2,492) (2,350)
labor cost
1 th. CZK 108.74 116.96 124.13 135.69 142.83
(63.94) (48.90) (46.17) (50.06) (61.68)
capital expenditures 0.043 0.041 0.043 0.043 0.046
(0.215) (0.239) (0.115) (0.116) (0.178)
sales
1 bill. CZK 1.337 1.283 1.271 1.212 1.252
(4.072) (3.482) (3.386) (3.180) (3.252)
inventories 0.287 0.250 0.263 0.254 0.228
(0.387) (0.312) (0.925) (0.583) (0.374)
total assets
1 bill. CZK 1.733 1.831 2.051 2.209 2.383
(5.841) (6.671) (8.328) (9.218) (10.19)
bank 0.148 0.151 0.166 0.185 0.198
(0.120) (0.120) (0.133) (0.145) (0.174)
technology mix
1 mill. CZK 0.599 0.658 0.731 0.812 0.863
(0.797) (0.892) (0.959) (1.118) (1.256)
sale eff. growth 0.1834 0.0956 0.0764 0.0453
(0.5508) (0.3858) (0.3450) (0.3063)
profitability growth 0.1872 -0.0942 -0.0330 0.0435
(2.4497) (2.8249) (3.7983) (2.7663)
empl. change -0.0413 -0.0289 -0.0265 -0.0207
(0.1744) (0.1294) (0.0965) (0.1249)
labor cost growth 0.1781 0.0806 0.0968 0.0546
(0.6162) (0.2146) (0.1971) (0.3585)
sale growth 0.1171 0.0517 0.0396 0.0197
(0.5224) (0.3518) (0.3293) (0.3033)
Notes: Number of observations for each year:483. Standard deviation in brackets. Definitions of the
variables are listed in Table 3. Growth variables defined as follows: growth=(vart-vart-1) / var t-1.
1 values are in CZK. Logarithmic transformation used in the regressions.21
Table 3: Variable Definitions
Variable Description
sale efficiency total sales in const. prices / # of employees (log)
profitability (total sales – cost of sales) / total sales
cost efficiency total sales / cost of sales
asset sale book value of fixed assets sold / total sales
employment number of employees (log)
labor cost wages and wage taxes / # of employees (log)
capital expenditures book value of unfinished fixed assets / total sales
sales total sales in constant prices (log)
inventories book value of inventory level / total sales
total assets book value of total assets in constant prices (log)
bank book value of bank loans / total assets
technology mix total assets in constant prices / # of employees (log)22






ind. adjusted sale efficiency -0.127 -0.031 0.021 0.137 25.53
***
sale efficiency 5.983 6.297 6.549 7.274 50.93
***
cost efficiency 1.543 1.443 1.330 1.295 2.37
*
employment 6.240 6.480 6.379 6.385 1.01
labor cost 4.566 4.730 4.778 4.904 6.53
***
sales 12.223 12.777 12.927 13.660 32.16
***
inventories 0.259 0.254 0.314 0.198 0.70
sale efficiency growth 0.204 0.073 0.077 0.047 3.30
**
cost efficiency growth -0.025 -0.040 -0.014 -0.025 0.16
employment change -0.039 -0.030 -0.035 -0.013 0.22
labor cost growth 0.164 0.084 0.073 0.088 1.31
sale growth 0.142 0.031 0.033 0.022 2.13
*
total assets 12.741 13.203 13.179 13.980 23.89
***
bank 0.160 0.180 0.180 0.157 0.15
technology mix 5.794 5.965 5.960 6.678 22.63
***
Notes: Number of observations: 2415 or 1934. Definitions of all the variables are listed in
Table 3. Significance level is denoted as follows: *** means significance at 1% level;
** means significance at 5% level; and * means significance at 10% level.
industry adjusted sale efficiencyi = (sei – seindi)/seindi; for firm i; where sei
denotes the level of sale efficiency for a firm i; seindi denotes the respective industry
average of sale efficiency.23






ind. adjusted cost efficiency -0.234 -0.037 0.072 0.381 55.31 ***
sale efficiency 6.716 6.726 6.439 6.224 8.36 ***
cost efficiency 1.220 1.299 1.433 1.730 9.50 ***
employment 6.512 6.418 6.380 6.174 2.11
labor cost 4.785 4.788 4.654 4.751 1.23
sales 13.228 13.144 12.820 12.397 12.45 ***
inventories 0.366 0.221 0.208 0.231 1.78
sale efficiency growth 0.129 0.074 0.092 0.107 0.34
cost efficiency growth -0.005 -0.012 -0.021 -0.067 1.18
employment change -0.030 -0.038 -0.035 -0.015 0.18
labor cost growth 0.115 0.109 0.101 0.086 0.11
sale growth 0.090 0.021 0.034 0.082 0.74
total assets 13.619 13.434 13.130 12.921 8.41 ***
bank 0.178 0.184 0.168 0.148 0.25
technology mix 6.224 6.134 6.018 6.023 1.32
Notes: Number of observations: 2415 or 1934. Definitions of all the variables are listed in
Table 3. Significance level is denoted as follows: *** means significance at 1% level;
** means significance at 5% level; and * means significance at 10% level.
industry adjusted cost efficiencyi = (cei – ceindi)/ceindi; for firm i; where cei
denotes the level of cost efficiency for a firm i; ceindi denotes the respective industry
average of cost efficiency.24
Table 6: Channels of Restructuring and their Measurement
Channel of restructuring Variable Expected effect on
performance
Asset contraction Asset sale positive
Labor shedding Employment change negative
Employee incentives Labor costs growth positive
Modernization of equipment Capital expenditures positive
Increased output Sales growth positive
Changes in control (to be added) Change of CEO positive
Inventory management Inventory level negative
Control variables
Meaning Variable
Size Total assets ?
Fund availability / soft budget constraint Bank loans ?
Capital utilization Technology mix positive
Notes: Definitions of all the variables are listed in Table 3. A question mark indicates that the
relationship is ambiguous.25
Table 7: Fixed Effects Estimates
sale efficiency profitability cost efficiency
ols within ols within ols within
constant -0.3770 *** 0.6011 *** 2.2009 ***
(0.1260) (0.0433) (0.1098)
asset sale 0.1425 *** 0.0998 *** -0.2213 *** -0.1957 *** -0.1520 *** -0.0984 ***
(0.0224) (0.0072) (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0197) (0.0183)
employment
 a 0.1486 *** 0.0064 0.2831 *** -0.0169
(0.0070) (0.0225) (0.0177) (0.0552)
labor cost 0.4404 *** 0.2751 *** 0.0876 *** -0.0798 *** 0.2248 *** -0.1266 ***
(0.0252) (0.0128) (0.0092) (0.0141) (0.0233) (0.0346)
cap. expend. -0.1206 ** 0.0234 0.0334 -0.0249 0.1548 *** -0.0325
(0.0593) (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0516) (0.0500)
total sales 0.7507 *** 0.7706 *** -0.1212 *** 0.0364 *** -0.3190 *** -0.0467 *
(0.0176) (0.0097) (0.0063) (0.0109) (0.0160) (0.0268)
inventories 0.1207 *** -0.0221 ** -0.0883 *** -0.0772 *** -0.1253 *** -0.1150 ***
(0.0185) (0.0088) (0.0064) (0.0087) (0.0163) (0.0214)
total assets -0.5933 *** -0.0881 *** -0.0281 *** -0.0289 * 0.0154 -0.0052
(0.0187) (0.0154) (0.0076) (0.0153) (0.0193) (0.0375)
bank loans 0.1338 * -0.1492 *** -0.1850 *** -0.1174 *** -0.4420 *** -0.2854 ***
(0.0710) (0.0385) (0.0244) (0.0382) (0.0618) (0.0936)
technol. mix 0.4837 *** 0.1515 *** 0.0531 *** 0.0177 * 0.0749 *** 0.0192
(0.0137) (0.0097) (0.0058) (0.0102) (0.0147) (0.0250)
R
2 0.733 0.9854 0.4395 0.7461 0.2552 0.6859
Hausman test 1901.40 328.82 364.32
Notes: Number of observations: 2415 (483x5). Definitions of all the variables listed in Table 3.
Standard errors presented in brackets. Significance level is denoted as follows: ***
means significance at 1% level; ** means significance at 5% level; and * means
significance at 10% level.
a Employment is not included in first set of equations because of identification
problems.26
 Notes: In constant prices. 1990 is considered to be the first year of transition in Poland and
Hungary; 1991 in the Czech Republic. Correspondingly, GDP in 1989 = 100% in
Poland and Hungary; GDP in 1990 = 100% in the Czech Republic.
Notes: In constant prices of 1990. 1990 is considered to be the first year of transition in
Poland and Hungary; 1991 in the Czech Republic. Correspondingly, GDP per worker
in 1989 = 100% in Poland and Hungary; GDP per worker in 1990 = 100% in the
Czech Republic.
Notes: Number of observations in each year: 483.
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